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ABSTRACT: Grassroots groups depend on dynamic and fluid interactions with high trust to retain their 
identity. At the same time, a stable structure and division of labour with rules and hierarchies is necessary 
to sustain their organisation and social influence. The study explores this organisational dilemma by 
drawing on the category of flexible institutionalisation. It enquires how actors experience this balancing 
act between spontaneous solidarity and hierarchical structures in the life of the collective. The study 
focuses on the PUMA complementary currency in Seville, which was the brainchild of a neighbourhood 
association, a degrowth group and the local community. Puma functioned as a mutual credit system with 
a passbook and later as a digital wallet. The research presents primary data collected in 2014, 2017 and 
2019 and concludes that the institutionalisation of social innovations is purposefully incomplete and reg-
ulates spaces of spontaneity and caring to preserve solidarity and identity.  
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1. Setting the scene 
 
Community currency systems, in the same way as other activists’ and grassroots’ 
groups, experience various tensions as they mature. A key pressure is to sustain their 
social influence in the longer term, which implies establishing rules of action and organ-
ising their interactions with other actors in business, government and civil society. They 
strive to reach internal agreements to add stability and predictability to what they do 
and how they do it in order to preserve their gains. At the same time, activism and con-
testation of the status quo rely on dynamic, flexible and fluid informal interactions with 
high trust that give meaning to grassroots’ innovations. Some scholars argue that insti-
tutional consolidation undermines the solidarity and the motivations that drive the ac-
tivism of civil society organisations (Bebbington et al., 2008a, Bebbington et al., 2008b, 
Mitlin et al., 2007, Islam, 2014). They suggest that a stable structure and a division of 
labour that often includes hierarchies stand against the grassroots’ way of life, with their 
aspiration for transformation and bias towards spontaneity (Fowler, 1997, Biekart and 
Fowler, 2013). The institutionalisation of activists’ groups hence seems to consolidate 
the collective while it also undermines their very essence (Fowler, 1997, Jansson and 
Sedaca, 2000).  
Institutions are defined as “structured processes of interaction among individuals, rel-
atively enduring and recognised as such” (Lawson, 2003: 182). Among other binding pat-
terns of interaction, the organisers of community currency systems (CCS) discuss the 
terms on which their non-state means of payments exist and circulate. In turn, the design 
of a complementary currency system relies on a myriad of agreements about the appeal 
of the symbol, the rules on issuing, the actions to sustain cohesion, and its locally binding 
governance system. A comparison between the large number of communities that ex-
periment with this scheme around the world and the small percentage of those that 
endure after a year underlines the tension between the enthusiasm of the origins and 
the challenge of longer-term institutionalisation (Blanc, 2011). 
The present research aims at conceptualising the process of institutionalisation from 
below, because it is performed by members of the community for current and future 
members of the community. The process of building institutions from below could allow 
CCS to grow in scale and endure in time, but it can also erode the shared values that 
breed it. This article discusses the balancing act between the informality, flexibility and 
solidarity of CCS, on one hand, and the longer-term goal of achieving stability, order and 
social permanence, on the other. We ask in what ways grassroots’ groups extend their 
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values to newcomers as these join the group with diverse interests and motivations. We 
also enquire how they preserve their internal solidarity as they establish more regula-
tions and hierarchies.  
For this analysis, we conducted a case study to gain depth into these social processes 
and we set the level of analysis at the meso level because we were not specifically inter-
ested in researching effects on or by the individual actors but their collective construc-
tion of rules around a complementary currency. We thus sought a case driven by an ex-
plicit contestation of the status quo as well as a longer-term plan to sustain a community 
currency. We chose a geographically constrained CCS, as opposed to one with virtual 
global existence, so we could observe the face to face negotiations among members. We 
chose a CCS that would also have transitioned from physical to digital. We decided to 
base our case study at the Puma CCS in the Spanish city of Seville because the debate we 
described was discussed explicitly and at length by its members.  
The Puma complementary currency system was an offspring of a neighbourhood as-
sociation founded to defend a historical building in the city of Seville in 2000. During the 
financial crisis in Spain around 2008, it merged with a group of degrowth activists. In 
March 2012 it organized a local currency with 20 participants to start what they de-
scribed as “a more human and sustainable economy”. Eighteen months later Puma CCS 
turned a membership of 800 participants who would come from other areas of the city. 
The organisers had serious problems to manage an initiative of that scale that relied only 
on voluntary, personal and unwritten rules. The core group then declared what it termed 
a “hibernation period” in which they suspended the operation of the CCS and the ac-
ceptance of new members until a more formal structure was discussed and established. 
They saw that institutionalisation had become pivotal for the survival and growth of the 
network while they also recognized that the basis of the collective was the person to 
person, spontaneous or informal interactions. Moreover, Puma transitioned to a digital 
currency in 2017, although this did not introduce major changes in their operations. The 
CCS was discontinued in 2019, at least formally. 
We obtained consented access to all the documents, reports and minutes elaborated 
by Puma, as well as authorisation to participate in its meetings and interview its mem-
bers. We collected primary data via interviews and participatory observation between 
May and November 2014, when we attended several hours of meetings. Later we kept 
in touch with Puma and attended their biannual meetings. We revisited the initiative in 
2017, when the physical notes transitioned to a digital platform, and in late 2019 when 
they collectively decided to stop the circulation of the currency. Over these years, the 
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scheme grew in organizational complexity as well as in professionalism, adopting a prag-
matic project and simultaneously remaining informal and encouraging personal auton-
omy. It is precisely the coexistence of these elements, institutionalization and flexibility, 
that represent a particularly interesting case to research. We describe the theoretical 
dilemma in the second section of this paper and the origins of Puma in the third one. 
The fourth section explains the institutionalisation process and the fifth one focuses on 
the politics of affections. We conclude by revisiting the concept of flexible institutionali-
sation and advancing its theorisation. 
 
 
2. Social construction of institutions 
 
This research departs from the conception of CCS as a grassroots’ innovation, a notion 
introduced by Seyfang and Smith (2007) as part of the new research agenda for sustain-
able development. Grassroots’ innovations are spaces for social experimentation and 
learning that sometimes manage to consolidate and disseminate. The authors focus on 
“community level action” that takes many forms, but are generally defined as “networks 
of activists and organisations generating novel bottom-up solutions for sustainable de-
velopment” (Seyfang and Smith, 2007: 585). The authors explain that grassroots innova-
tions, including complementary currency systems, take many “institutional forms” (ibid, 
p. 591) in terms of their organisation, resource base, governance system, ideology and 
the social need they aim to address. They argue that many of these innovations seek to 
grow and achieve social influence in the longer run. 
We will argue that the bottom up institutionalisation process in such communities 
takes the form of “flexible institutionalization”, a concept first introduced by Hans Pruijt 
(2003) in his study of a squat collective in the Netherlands. The notion of flexible institu-
tionalisation was coined to capture the tensions in reconciling the claims from a part of 
the group that aimed to establish stable rules and find a more favourable integration in 
society versus another more radical part of the collective that preferred to maintain 
spontaneity, informality and disruption of the status quo without envisioning specific 
longer term planning. The mobilisation starts by building networks, when activists are 
able to attract participants and gather resources to coordinate collective action (Pruijt, 
2007: 5115). Community and grassroots collectives such as Puma similarly begin with 
group contestations of the status quo that motivate collective action but often derive 
into other paths. While Pruij does not delve into the dimensions or implications of the 
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concept of flexible institutionalisation, we found that the notion facilitates the under-
standing of the problem we described above.  
Grassroots’ groups also engage the existent institutions that structure interactions be-
tween individuals, including those in a formal or written way, such as legal regulations, 
and in informal or unwritten form, such as culture, norms, or discourses. They are guided 
by common purposes to resist already institutionalised and formal counterparts such the 
government, but they also interact with them. Several scholars (Campbell, 2004, Gómez, 
2019, Cleaver, 2002) elaborated on this process of “bricolage” as a path to create new 
institutions from below by leveraging on the old ones. The term was first used by (Levi 
Strauss, 1962: 16) to explain how agents recombine elements in their institutional rep-
ertoire “with devious means” and deal with obstacles with “some extraneous move-
ment”. Some authors claim that institutionalization occurs at the end of the life cycle of 
social movements (Castells, 1983) and as a consequence of changes in their action rep-
ertoire like more routinized and less spontaneous methods that replace disruption 
(Kriesi, 1995), which suggests an identity loss. Other authors (Tarrow and Tollefson, 
1994, Membretti, 2007) have argued that in contemporary social movements institu-
tionalization does not necessarily imply that the creative and disruptive zeal of a move-
ment is in decline. On the contrary, they maintain that it is possible to engage in a pro-
cess of flexible institutionalisation with only partial structuring and in which a radical 
wing continues to produce disruption.  
Pruijt (2003) considered that towards the end of an institutional construction process, 
there are two predominant ways of integration into the mainstream social structure: co-
optation and institutionalization. Co-optation is “the process of absorbing new elements 
into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of 
averting threats to its stability or existence” (Pruijt 2003:134) while institutionalisation 
occurs when “a movement is channelled into a stable pattern based on formalized rules 
and laws” (Pruijt 2003:134). In this second variant, expected behaviour is rather clear 
and sanctions for non-compliance are in place. The author distinguishes between “ter-
minal institutionalisation”, where convention and routines replace creative disruption, 
and “flexible institutionalization”, where conventional tactics coexist or complement the 
disruptive ones. Therefore, bottom up institutionalisation is essentially a contradictory 
process of continuous tension between a flexible and a creative part of the organisation 
that values the creative disruption of social movements and pressures to achieve higher 
degrees of formalisation that would enable it to participate in existing institutions such 
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as the state, to legitimate its actions, and to gain access to a wider range of resources 
and alliances. 
Local communities create their own money in the understanding that money is a so-
cially-constructed institution that is “attached to a variety of social relations” (Seyfang 
and Pearson, 2000: 236). The introduction of a complementary currency seeks to rein-
vent social and economic life according to different values in which competition, individ-
ual accumulation and money scarcity would be replaced by other values, such as “shar-
ing, solidarity, equality and fraternity” (Latouche, 2009: 94). Complementary currencies 
are sometimes conceived as local resistance projects (Gomez and de Wit, 2015, North, 
1999, North, 2007) because they are a down to earth practical way to challenge the 
“capitalist existence” through day-to-day economic practices that do not re-create the 
relations that prevail outside (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Complementary currency systems 
hence represent a small scale and localized resistance to the mainstream power relations 
(micro-political).  
This view combines a Foucauldian understanding of money as a “local system of dom-
ination”, Scott’s “micro-political resistances” (Scott, 1976, Scott, 1990) and Pickerill and 
Chatterton (2006) concept of “autonomous geography”. As a system of domination, 
money has its own modes of power and local practices, whereby subjects reconstruct 
themselves and their economic life through the money that they create (North, 2007: 
28). James C. Scott (1976) argued that every system of domination has its own ritual of 
subordination, so micro-politics are “everyday forms of resistance” designed to mitigate 
specific forms of domination at a local level. A micro-political analysis of social action 
around money engages also with the concept of “autonomy from the grassroots” as or-
ganizing principle (Credland et al., 2003: 107). In theory, CCS members are moved by a 
desire for freedom, self-organisation and mutual aid that comes from a rejection of an 
economic and political system where “lives are manufactured for us, instead of being 
the outcome of our choices and desires” (Credland et al., 2003: 109). Pickerill and Chat-
terton (2006: 730) refer to autonomous geographies to define “those spaces where 
there is a questioning of the laws and social norms of society and a creative desire to 
constitute non-capitalist, collective forms of politics, identity, and citizenship”. Chatter-
ton (2005: 547) elaborates that collective autonomy “simultaneously refuses and pro-
poses, destroys and creates”.  
 
 
3. The start of Puma 
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In recent years complementary currency systems (CCS) have been developed in dif-
ferent countries as strategic tools to foster more sustainable local economies (Seyfang 
and Pearson, 2000, Gomez and Helmsing, 2008, Fare, 2013). Puma promoters were in-
spired by their emancipatory potential to build a more autonomous and ecological alter-
native to the mainstream economy. Puma is one of the experiences of non-state mone-
tary systems that has been implemented in the last decades around the world and rep-
resented the convergence of several groups of actors. 
In Seville, Pumarejo is a traditionally working class area situated in the northern old 
part of the city. Lloveras (2014) suggested that during the 40 years that Franco’s regime 
lasted, authorities saw Pumarejo as a focal point for political dissidence, so they opted 
for a deliberate strategy of abandonment and repression of their radical political culture. 
The area gradually became a pocket of crime, resulting in the stigmatization of the neigh-
bourhood as a dangerous area associated to homelessness, prostitution, and drugs (Llo-
veras 2014:156). However, in the late 1990s Pumarejo became the target for speculative 
practices in the property market that forced the eviction of traditional working-class res-
idents and attracted higher income households (Rodríguez and Verdugo, 2010). Social 
struggle against gentrification emerged when local authorities announced an ambitious 
plan for the regeneration of the area.  
The Pumarejo Palace was a magnificent building whose origins date back to the 18th 
century and did not escape speculative practices. In 1975 the house was inherited by 
four brothers who neglected the property and in 2001 they were approached by a hotel 
chain willing to purchase 50% of the property to open a boutique hotel (Hornillo, 2005). 
The rumour spread and the community started to organise itself to protect the building 
and its residents (Hornillo. 2005). Already in 2000 the local residents created the Neigh-
bours’ Association in Defence of the Pumarejo Palace (NADPP) (Lloveras 2014:176) to 
defend the rights of the tenants to live in decent conditions in the building as well as to 
preserve the artisans and commercial uses of the ground floor (Lloveras 2014:175). The 
association combined public protests with producing a large body of research on the 
heritage of the Palace to achieve the administrative legal protection of the building. In 
2003 the building was declared monument of architectural and cultural interest by the 
city and this declaration was a turning point for the NADPP (Lloveras 2014:175). Two 
years later the local government expropriated the building arguing that the owners were 
not preserving it properly and in 2011 the use of the common spaces was transferred to 
an offspring of the NADPP, the Casa Pumarejo Association, for a period of 15 years 
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(Hornillo. 2005). In collaboration with a museum and the Andalusian Historical Heritage 
Institute, rehabilitation plans were prepared.  
 
Image 1. View of Pumarejo Palace 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2014 
 
After this significant gain, the NADPP entered a deep internal debate. The involvement 
of some members in the struggle had become a full-time occupation that left them little 
time to secure a livelihood (Lloveras 2014:182). According to a former member of 
NADPP, a proposal was made to collect and distribute a small symbolic number of Euros 
as a reward for the commitment of the most involved individuals (Personal interview 
A1). This was a step forward in caring for each other and as a symbol of the solidarity 
prevalent among the members. However, some members argued that Pumarejo Palace 
could become a source of income and a community meeting place at the same time. 
At that stage of the discussion, another association, the Degrowth Seville group, sug-
gested launching a complementary currency system. There was a lively Degrowth Seville 
network in the city that aimed at connecting and promoting local initiatives in various 
areas. Degrowth originated as a social movement in France in 2001, Italy in 2004, and 
Spain in 2006 (D'Alisa et al., 2013: 215). Its principles are defined as “a collective and 
deliberative process aimed at the equitable downscaling of the overall capacity to pro-
duce and consume and of the role of markets and commercial exchanges as a central 
organising principle of human lives” (Schneider et al., 2010: 1, Sekulova et al., 2013). In 
Seville, the Degrowth group was hosted in the Pumarejo Palace and attracted activists 
around agroecology, alternative medicine, and food security. Degrowth Seville partici-
pated in the discussions about “giving back” to volunteers and proposed a CCS to support 
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members economically while enhancing social cohesion at the same time. The discussion 
was enriched by evidence from Argentina, where the community currency systems sup-
ported poor households to diversify income sources and improve their livelihoods 
(Gomez, 2010).  
The Puma currency was hence the brainchild of three different groups, namely 
degrowth activists, NADPP members and a growing number of residents who were being 
hit by the financial crisis around 2010. Many residents were suffering the effects of un-
employment and underemployment and were attracted to Puma CCS as a functional de-
vice to complement their income. In general, in the south of Spain the landscape of com-
munity currencies changed dramatically with that crisis. In 2008 there was only one CCS 
in the region of Andalusia (Zoquito, in the province of Cadiz) and in June 2014 there were 
five groups only in the city area of Seville (Puma, La Oliva, El Chabir, La Jara and El Alcor), 
as shown in Map 1. 
The establishment of Puma implied making rules to facilitate members’ interactions. 
For instance, it was decided that Puma would operate as a mutual credit system. New 
members would open an account with zero balance and would announce the goods and 
services they could offer as well as what they wanted to obtain. In a mutual credit system 
like Puma, the sum of all accounts in the network is always zero, while individual bal-
ances will be negative or positive. Software matched the balances of buyers and sellers 
(https://www.community-exchange.org/home/) and made this information available to 
all. Members also agreed to place a flexible limit of 100 Pumas as the maximum debt 
that a debtor can have. Instead of speaking of “debt”, the organisers spoke of “commit-
ment” towards the community, meaning that the community trusts that its members 
will provide goods and services to repay the debt. It is an interest-free system, so there 
is no incentive to hoard Pumas. Although Puma was linked to the euro, prices varied 
widely because they were negotiated freely between the parties involved.   
 
Map 1. Community currencies in Spain (April 2012) 
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Source: (Gisbert Quero, 2010) 
 
Exchanges were recorded on a paper passbook and these would be transferred to 
consolidated records for the whole group. However, members often forgot to report 
their transactions and balances but the group trusted that no member would go above 
the established limit (Speck and González Palanco, 2019). For convenience, the passbook 
was replaced by an application on smartphones in 2017 which transferred exchanges 
automatically. The history of Puma is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Chronology of Puma 
Initial stage: 
negotiation, 
cooperation 
and network 
formation  
Oct. 2011 
- Workshop about community currencies in Pumarejo 
- First steps and strategic decisions about the nature and ob-
jectives of the currency.  
- Creation of the ‘steering group’ with 20 members.  
Jan. 2012 
-Puma CCS launched as a pilot project. A small group of mem-
bers begin making exchanges.  
-Functioning improvements are made.  
-First market on Pumarejo square.      
March 2012 
-Public launch 
-1st Mercapuma is celebrated  
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Consolida-
tion of the in-
stitutional 
structure 
Jan. 2013 
-Number of members grows rapidly and producers and local 
business become part of the currency.  
-New working groups are created.  
-High level of public exposure (conferences, radio and TV pro-
grams, workshops, etc.).    
- Supply Centre is created (commitment to provide ecological, 
local and handcraft food in Pumas) 
-Creation of the ‘community care’ working group.  
May 2013 -Organisation of the National meeting of local currencies. 
Sep 2013 
-Funding of external projects: pumafunding (€/Pumas). 
-Deploying skills to promote new local currencies in the areas 
of Seville 
-Puma reaches 800 members. 
Reflecting ac-
tion stage 
Nov 2013 
-Declaration of hibernation process.  
- Ban on new memberships. 
-Reflection in working groups. 
-Redefinition of ‘giving back’ practices.  
-Dynamization group is created.  
New de-
signed insti-
tution 
Jul. 2014-
Sep 2014 
-New members are accepted only if they participate and are 
committed to the project.  
-New welcoming process is introduced, placing more empha-
sis on trust and solidarity than practicalities of the currency.  
-Puma CCS renewed interest in funding external projects.  
-New synergies among ‘new’ promoters and ‘original’ promot-
ers are created though collective learning.     
New de-
signed insti-
tution 
November 
2016 to Jan-
uary 2017 
-Transition from passbook to application in smartphones that 
works on Community Exchange Software (CES) 
-Not all members complied in practice 
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Transition to 
other initia-
tives 
2019 
-The General Assembly voted to deactivate PUMA, to stop or-
ganising the markets and to close the supply centre. At the 
end of 2019, three members signed the act that ends the CCS  
-Exchange groups continue functioning informally and some 
members still use PUMA as a currency among themselves but 
keep no formal records 
-Several other social groups were formed, such as environ-
mental consultancies and La Transicionera, https://latransi-
cionera.net/. 
Source: compiled by the authors 
 
 
4. The extension dilemma 
 
While the organisers of PUMA were seeking a way to complement their income, they 
also wished to reach out to the “common people” in the Pumarejo neighbourhood to 
benefit them in the same way. They assumed that a CCS would equip neighbours with a 
tool to make a living while engaging them with an anti-capitalist daily practice. The neigh-
bourhood economy could thus “serve the immediate needs of the community” (Díaz, 
2014) and at the same time it could construct an autonomous geography in the sense of 
Pickerill and Chatterton (2006). Membership was open and everyone with time or skills 
was welcome, including people from other areas of Seville. This inclusiveness to reach 
out to broader groups was reflected in the welcoming sessions, the use of Facebook and 
Twitter, and a monthly radio program.  
The organizational model was based on a weekly general assembly, in which decision 
making was deliberative and spontaneous. During this stage, Puma operated on three 
principles: horizontal personal relationships (rejection of hierarchy), informality (lack of 
fixed roles) and governance by assembly (search for consensus). One of the founding 
members reaffirmed: “Puma is a completely horizontal organisation. It is completely 
open to everyone, so we do not have kings or presidents. We all command here” (quoted 
in radio show La Farsa Monea, Gonzalez and Hoop (2012). 
The organisers conceived Puma as a political tool for building a countercultural alter-
native space that operated under specific economic and social rules. The notion of micro-
political resistance conceptualized by Scott (Scott, 1990) came to life in Seville’s Puma. 
A Puma member expressed: “Puma is a type of money made by and for the community 
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that gives us power at a personal level and as a community make our own decisions over 
the thing we want to change” (Díaz, 2014). The first aspect is related to the capacity of 
Puma to strengthen community ties through human economic relations “because 
through Puma you meet people from your neighbourhood, when you purchase a good 
or a service from another user within the scheme, you interact from a different set of 
values: trust, cooperation and solidarity” (Díaz, 2014). The second aspect is related to 
the localization of economic activity, “to encourage that the wealth we create stays in 
the neighbourhood”. In turn, Puma members place a great importance on being able to 
change habits such as purchasing food “out of the established capitalist system of super-
markets, where products are full of chemicals” (Personal interview A7) while another 
member confirmed that “with Puma currency you are supporting local producers so they 
can live without being exploited. The benefits don’t go to someone you don’t know” 
(Personal interview A8). 
Puma represented a collective journey for local autonomy, that members described 
as one of taking distance from a world that “serves the very specific interests of eco-
nomic and political elites” (Díaz, 2014). Hardt and Negri (2009: 212) characterized such 
periods in terms of “disengagement, or desertion and exodus” from the capitalist sys-
tem. During the first years of activity, Puma was not only successful in attracting users 
but also in keeping them active. Expansion was gradual and depended mainly on dissem-
ination by word of mouth through relatives, friends and Pumarejo neighbours. The small 
group of people that launched Puma shared a common vision and history, so trust was 
high, coupled with the conviction in the advantages on their local economy. Between 
March 2012 and December 2013, a total of 4.643 exchanges were made and 11.515 Eu-
ros and 42975 Pumas were exchanged. Membership soared to 800 households in only 
six months.  
At the same time, the expansion challenged Puma because the increasing numbers of 
newcomers had different levels of motivation, interests and understandings of the initi-
ative. The new members were primarily driven by an income-generation motivation. 
They saw the CCS as a palliative to the economic crisis and were not committed to a 
global degrowth strategy as the initial members were. Similar problems of scaling up 
have been researched in other social economy initiatives. When a group expands, goals 
and actions become less coherent, while managerial and coordination problems arise in 
a process called the “extension dilemma” (Jasper, 2004: 7). Puma has not escaped this 
“dilemma”. It was launched as a “network of trust”, according to the description of the 
members (Personal interview A2), but the rapid growth of membership put at risk this 
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identity as well as the future sustainability of Puma. The embryonic group grew in both 
numbers and complexity because individuals from different backgrounds and areas of 
the city started to join. The organisers were confident in transferring the values and prac-
tices of Puma and said that “we're building a network of trust, and precisely in this kind 
of network it is not necessary to put restrictions because everything flows” (González 
and Hoop 2012). A few months later, the same respondent expressed her concerns at 
the growth of the initiative: “I have my doubts that we are transmitting the objectives of 
the currency” (quoted in La farsa monea radio show, by González and Hoop, 2013). Dur-
ing fieldwork we could not find any new members that could explain to us the meaning 
of degrowth or its relation to a complementary currency system. At the level of the man-
agement of the scheme, the group remained coherent because the organisational tasks 
were carried out by the original group. There was a similar fragmentation in the case of 
the Redes de Trueque in Argentina which marked a vertical contradiction between the 
members and of the leaders (Gomez and de Wit, 2015). 
In the same way as common values and identities started to diversify, the scaling up 
of Puma also made decision-making more cumbersome. The principle that “we all com-
mand here” was becoming impractical and a more complex and decentralized organisa-
tional structure became necessary. The initial stage of Puma as an informal group in 
which everyone did everything ended and gave rise to a formal division of labour. Work-
ing groups were organised with differentiated competences, marking a transition from 
spontaneous decision-making to a stable formal organisation with tasks and responsibil-
ities. A “Steering Group” was set up to carry out the tasks of coordination and organisa-
tion of Puma. Working groups functioned autonomously, held separate meetings and 
had their own targets, so coordinating practices were designed to ensure that all mem-
bers of the network were aware of the progress made by the different working groups. 
These included social media (e.g. general email-lists) as well as scheduled face to face 
meetings (e.g. general assemblies). The definition of this governance structure was an 
important step towards the institutionalisation of Puma and the management of what 
Jasper (2004) termed the extension dilemma. New rules were designed to promote 
higher commitment, enhance member’s mobilisation and protect the trust and solidarity 
that were present in the initial stages of Puma. 
However, it was not enough and in September 2013, a group of members of the Steer-
ing group began to voice concerns that ideas and practices in Puma were not being sub-
jected to enough critical scrutiny. A key objective of the scheme was to provide healthy 
and affordable food for the community but those who joined the currency looking for 
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affordable food and sources of income in the recession were often viewed as opportun-
istic and not understanding the “true” values of the currency around degrowth dis-
courses. An internal document stated that, “inertia and creative improvisation has 
pushed us forward without really knowing where we are going to or why” (González and 
Hoop 2013). In addition, feelings of exhaustion became common among the organisers 
and were attributed to the increase in the workload.  
In November 2013, the organisers launched a process of reflective action that they 
termed “hibernation process”. The first task was to map the situation of every working 
group and collect feedback on the way on them. The original desire to create an open 
and inclusive community changed with the hibernation period, which resulted in a 
downscaling of the initiative. For example, the rules and practices of the initiation pro-
cess changed to restrict membership. Greater importance was placed on transmitting 
the values of Puma and enhancing its “structural cohesion”, so all members were ex-
pected to contribute to the administrative functions of the scheme.  
An additional level of closure was obtained indirectly with the introduction of the dig-
ital wallet, which restricted the use of Puma to younger and more educated users. “You 
need to have a certain cell phone and have the capacity to manage certain technologies”, 
as an organiser expressed. The digitalisation of payments in Puma also reduced the need 
to organise physical markets regularly, which made members trade face to face with 
each other. By enabling transactions on-line, the digitalisation of Puma created a larger 
distance among members and the perception that community can exist without regular 
local contacts to sustain it. 
Decision making processes took place in working groups and general assemblies were 
less frequent (once a month at most). Some groups furthered their reliance on rules and 
agreements while the Steering Group remained highly informal and its members, almost 
exclusively belonging to the founding group, adjusted their degrees of involvement as 
needed. Puma became “more project-oriented”, introducing two degrees of involve-
ment: members who carried out the main tasks (“hard core”) and those who occasionally 
worked on a project (“periphery”). New working groups were created (e.g. the mobilisa-
tion group), others adapted their tasks (e.g the welcoming group) and two were elimi-
nated (currency studies group and community caring groups). Graph 1 describes the 
changes in the working groups that followed the hibernation period: in red we identify 
the groups that were eliminated, in green the groups that were renamed or adapted 
their tasks and in blue the groups that became separate entities outside the boundaries 
of Puma for-profit basis. The new organisation was described as a “network-like flexible 
Gómez, Medina Prado, The flexible institutionalization process of Puma currency in Seville, Spain 
 
529 
 
 
 
structure with a high degree of fragmentation”. A new member of the Steering group 
expressed that, “self-organization implies that you are free to get involved and fill the 
space you desire, while others are free to leave. If someone wants to go, then others will 
gradually take more responsibility” (Personal interview A7).  
In short, the extension dilemma (Jasper 2004:7) was overcome with a de-growth per-
spective: Puma “rescaled down” the CCS to return to the original ideas and reduce the 
number of users. According to the participants, the goal was to create a community of 
mutual care in which the complementary currency would occupy the role of a tool to 
support diverse degrowth projects. However, observation during fieldwork suggests that 
desires to create a more exclusive space to maintain the countercultural essence of the 
currency was turning Puma into a closed “activist hub” with homogenous class, race and 
cultural identities (middle class, white, sub-cultural). While this strategy may increase 
coherence and sustainability in the long run, it was also reducing the dynamism and di-
versity of those involved. As far as we could observe, it was failing to engage “the com-
mon people” to perform degrowth practices in their everyday lives as a mechanism of 
micro-political resistance. A member confessed to us that, “sometimes I doubt that the 
reality of the Pumarejo Palace is the reality of the neighbourhood” (Personal interview 
A2). Puma has incorporated the extension dilemma in its structure and institutionalised 
modalities to preserve a core identity of contentious politics. 
  
Graph 1. Working groups in 2013 and 2016 
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Source: Compiled by authors 
5. Solidarity and the politics of caring 
 
As a result of fifteen years of autonomous neighbourhood politics against gentrifica-
tion, the Pumarejo community developed “the politics of affections”. As conceptualized 
by Jeffrey Juris (2008), “affective solidarity” differs from the traditionally confrontational 
way of doing micro-political resistance (Scott, 1976). The practice of affections belongs 
in an autonomous geography and includes economic solidarity and caring for each other. 
In that line, a Puma member expressed, “the currency has just made visible many invis-
ible practices of care that were already taking place within NADPP. If someone said that 
she did not have enough money to pay for electricity this month, we would collect 
money to help” (Personal interview A1). 
The collective sense of support and solidarity was synthesized in the shared notion 
that “Alone we go nowhere; affection keeps us together” (González and Hoop 2013). 
NADPP activists pointed out that interpersonal relationships of affection have been vital 
for sustaining many years of activism and building solidarity around the leitmotiv that 
“Affection is revolutionary”. This statement was a graffiti that appeared on one of the 
front walls of the Pumarejo. We asked NADPP activists what this statement meant. One 
answered that, “affection is revolutionary. It is another way to build (…). It is to care for 
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others, to give a hug, sharing with others what has happened to you, because you are 
part of this community. It is a peaceful way, without attacking others. This often confuses 
militants”. (Personal interview A1) 
Calling for a new order based on “affections” has resulted in a different notion of cit-
izenship within the Puma community. At the entrance of the palace there is also a com-
memoratory notice placed when the building was reopened as community centre with 
the inscription: “on May 8th, 2004 this community centre was inaugurated to host the 
power of the neighbours of El Pumarejo and for the use and enjoyment of the cuida-
danía” (translated as “caringzenship”). The term “caringzenship”, according to internal 
documents of Puma, refers to a kind of citizenship that is guided by the ethics of care 
which implies a conscious effort to care for each other and to care for what is around 
them. Puma extended the notion of “autonomous politics of place” coined by Chatterton 
(2005) to promoting sharing, economic solidarity and care. In line with the concept of 
social cohesion developed by Moody and White (2003), spontaneous caring practices 
function as a mechanism to deepen trust and promote ‘affective solidarity’ (Juris 
2008:65).  
In the case of Puma, the scheme had gradually established rules around rewards to 
make visible individuals’ contributions. Giving visibility and rewarding voluntary work for 
the wellbeing of the community was a crucial concern for NADPP activists when the 
Puma currency was introduced. Members then agreed to create a formal mechanism so 
that people involved in organisational tasks could receive a symbolic monetary reward 
of Pumas in compensation for their voluntary work (the “devoluciones del común” or 
distributions from the commons, in English). These practices are in line with eco-feminist 
theoretical developments that have been incorporated to degrowth in relation to repro-
ductive labour (Dobscha, 1993, Dobscha and Ozanne, 2001).The distributions from the 
commons operated by encouraging Puma members to fill in a self-evaluation form about 
their contributions to caring for the community every three months. Members were 
asked to rate such contributions as sporadic, intermittent and continuous, so they would 
obtain 20, 50 and 100 pumas per semester, respectively. 
The hibernation period introduced a new compensation mechanism because there 
were disagreements among members, who argued that the system was unable to reflect 
well enough the amount of work done for the community. After January 2014 each work-
ing group made a collective reflection and decided on the rewards, instead of being an 
individual self-evaluation, but during fieldwork in July 2014 it was clear that only the 
Supply Centre Group carried out this collective reflection about compensations. In other 
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words, despite the great emphasis of Puma in creating formal mechanisms to make work 
visible, these were not enforced across the organisation because members generally 
preferred spontaneous caring practices. A member underlined: “I think that people ex-
perienced it in a contradictory way. There are those who want to place a value on eve-
rything because otherwise that work remains invisible or undervalued and there are oth-
ers who feel it is wrong to place a monetary value on everything. They think that if they 
want to do something for this person, why do they have to give a number to that?” (Per-
sonal interview 8).   
So, while Puma structured social time and spaces to foster solidarity among members, 
most caring practices retained their informal and spontaneous character that resist for-
mal regulation via institutions. Many members suggested that they needed the collec-
tive support of other members to feel appreciated and strengthen the feeling that “you 
are not alone” (Personal interview A5). For example, the “Taller de costura” was a sewing 
workshop that took place every Thursday afternoon. The original objective was to learn 
a skill but also to provide emotional support to one of the old residents of the Pumarejo 
Palace, who was the main instructor. The space gradually became a collective ritual 
where members met in a room called “Bajo 5” and brought coffee and cookies to share 
with other members. We observed little sewing in the workshop and a lot of laughter. 
The space is referred as a non-hierarchical forum in which activists express how they felt 
that day, shared inter-generational wisdom, remembered past collective actions or 
looked for counselling, even on family matters. A member said: “The other day one of 
the members brought me a dress that she wanted to get fixed. I did it without any obli-
gation and fixing her dress is a symbolic reward for the work she does for the community. 
I don’t need anything else.” (Personal interview A1). Informal solidarity appeared as a 
crucial part of the social relations of community and provided social cohesion to sustain 
the vision of an autonomous geography.  
Such informal “caring practices” are the “glue” in social horizontal networks in which 
members put together their personal political beliefs (Juris 2008:65). A sophisticated un-
derstanding of the “politics of affection” developed in the Pumarejo Association was 
transferred to the Puma CCS members. Informal affective solidarity played a crucial role 
in keeping the interest in the movement and making members feel part of a collective. 
“It’s like a small family”, a member expressed (Personal interview A5). The notion of 
“politics of affections”, as referred by Juris (2008), is seen as a force to mobilize struc-
tures and gather resources in collective action. At the same time, Puma functioned as a 
currency, although a complementary one, so practices of care have been adapted to a 
Gómez, Medina Prado, The flexible institutionalization process of Puma currency in Seville, Spain 
 
533 
 
 
 
combination of a capitalist logic with the concern to maintaining solidarity and the pro-
ject of contentious politics. Informal practices of caring were perceived as pillars within 
this project and were summarized in the words that, “affection is revolutionary” at the 
entrance of the Pumarejo Palace.  
Interesting enough, the Puma currency does not circulate any more since 2019 but 
the organisers were hesitant to terminate it formally (Interview A9 in 2020). The various 
social media sites do not mention the end of the currency and some exchange groups 
continue operating informally. In a mutual credit system, all balances should be cleared 
against each other back to nil, but this has not been done; the accounts in the Commu-
nity Exchange System CES and the digital wallets have not been cancelled either. “Be-
sides sporadic transactions that we do not monitor, Puma is still alive in the social rela-
tions that it has generated”, one of the organisers assured (Interview A9). Indeed, the 
sewing workshop, which was identified as a key practice of spontaneous caring, contin-
ues to meet every Thursday as we enter 2020. The hardcore members were determi-
nant: “It was a wonderful love relation. Together we created the currency and together 
we killed it”. 
 
 
6. Conclusions: Flexible Institutionalisation as balancing act 
 
Activists’ and grassroots’ groups depend on dynamic and fluid interactions with high 
trust to retain their identity but when they aim at persisting in time and expanding their 
social influence, they also require stable rules and regulations to structure their interac-
tions. This research analysed that tension by drawing on the concept of flexible institu-
tionalisation coined by Pruijt (2007). The tension between institutionalisation and spon-
taneous interactions has been tackled in the literature on social movements and grass-
roots innovations but it has rarely been discussed in dialogue with empirical data. It is 
unclear which one takes precedence over the other. For example, authors such as Cas-
tells (1983) argued that institutionalisation implies identity loss, while Tarrow and 
Tollefson (1994) claim that institutionalization is not incompatible with the original val-
ues of contentious collective action. However, they suggest that different types of grass-
roots and social innovations prioritise either side of the tension. This research conducted 
a case study of the complementary currency Puma in the Spanish city of Seville with 
primary data collection in 2014, 2017 and 2019, when Puma was discontinued at least 
formally.  
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The research found that actors in Puma were acutely aware of their balancing act 
within this tension and experienced it daily in their organisational life. They incorporated 
it in their discussions and common spaces in attempts to preserve an identity of sponta-
neity while giving predictability to their initiative. On the one hand, members structured 
hierarchies, alliances with other actors and mechanisms of exclusion. Institutionalization 
advanced in gradual steps of organizational consolidation, illustrated by the attempt to 
standardise the compensations of the commons, the division of labour in working groups 
with hierarchies, the formalisation of governance structures and the regulation of stable 
spaces for different types of interactions. On the other hand, members discussed repeat-
edly their intention to maintain the autonomous and informal character of the organisa-
tion and embedded this desire in caring practices, which were non-formalized interper-
sonal actions of spontaneous solidarity. Affections created new relational paths among 
members and were perceived as an essential identity element of the currency system.  
The category of affective solidarity (Juris 2008) was critical to understand the ways in 
which Puma members kept the affinity of a collective identity and sustained the con-
struction of their alternative local economic scheme. In spaces where spontaneous ac-
tion prevails, agents displayed the politics of caring and rejected or ignored attempts 
towards regulation. In the opposite extreme, some rules were discussed, agreed and in-
troduced to structure solidarity and identity formation. In between, there was a variety 
of combinations, such as spaces that were specifically regulated to remain informal and 
others in which formal rules were preferred but were enforced loosely. Puma showed 
that organisations can retain the way of life of the grassroots for a considerable time 
without moving towards further formalisation. After all, affections are revolutionary, as 
proclaimed at the entrance of the Pumarejo Palace. 
In short, this study concluded that the process of institutionalisation of social innova-
tions such as Puma is purposefully left incomplete. Although retaining substantial flexi-
bility, social innovations can be institutionalised from below in the sense that they con-
figure stable and formal rules to regulate community actions. Attempts can be made to 
regulate solidarity, but some spaces simply resist any institutionalisation. In Puma, spon-
taneity and caring prevailed as mechanisms to preserve identity and social cohesion. In-
stitutionalisation is hence characterised as flexible because there are many areas for 
spontaneous, creative and fluid interaction within structures and which support of these 
structures. In other words, institutionalisation and social cohesion are interdependent 
because they require each other to endure. 
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Puma also had to face the extension dilemma as conceptualised by Jasper (2004). The 
initiative scaled up in membership and attracted numerous newcomers with different 
interests and levels of commitment. Newcomers renewed the energy and the creative-
ness of the group, but they also increased heterogeneity in values and cohesiveness. In 
a project of contentious politics, the tensions between sticking to the values of core 
group versus its expansion to more heterogeneous segments of the population had im-
portant implications. The organisers saw this tension as the key development that 
started the demise of the Puma currency, and their inability to extend the same core 
principles of solidarity to the new members. The values of the hardcore members even-
tually decided to deactivate the currency, at least formally, but other initiatives derived 
from it. The organisers considered the currency not an end but a means to achieve a 
more autonomous future. 
 
7. Appendix 1. Interviewees’ profile 
 
Interview Id Interviewee gender Involved mainly with 
A1 Female Steering group/Administration 
A2 Female Steering group/Supply center 
A3 Female Steering group/Caring practices 
A4 Male Steering group/Welcoming 
A5 Female Local producer/health  
A6 Male Local producer /food 
A7 Male Local producer/food 
A8 Female Local producer/food 
A9 Male Steering group/Administration 
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